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CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivation
Cascaded events such as transmission line and generator outages have contributed to catastrophic power failures, such as the U.S. Northeast blackout of 1965 [1] [2], New York power failure in 1977 [3] , July 2 and August 10, 1996, outages on the western interconnection [4] , and the blackout in the eastern interconnection in Aug. 2003 [5] . The undesirable tripping of generators caused by over-excitation protection contributed to the cascaded events in Aug. 10, 1996, WECC disturbance, Aug. 22, 1987, Tennessee disturbance, and June 5, 1967, PJM Disturbance [11] .
With the available technologies today, it is impossible to predict the cascaded events in real-time or ahead of time. However, it is possible to identify basic patterns leading to cascaded events based on the results of on-line steady state contingency evaluation that is performed every several minutes. Undesirable generator tripping by the over-excitation protection is one of the basic patterns leading to cascaded events. Identifying the existence of the relay operations ahead of time is an effective way to prevent cascaded generator tripping events. Once the undesirable cascaded generator tripping can be identified, the dispatchers will be able to take actions to reduce the armature and field currents of the generator(s) involved. These preventive actions may require several minutes.
The proposed approach in this thesis is to extend the on-line security assessment framework that is based on a list of next contingencies. The identification of cascaded events will enhance our ability to avoid catastrophic outages. A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is developed to identify contingencies that are likely to trigger cascaded generator tripping. Offline time-domain simulation cases are performed for the construction of a rule base and verification of the performance. This thesis is concentrated on the cascaded generator tripping events due to over-excitation protection. A related task in this research is concerned with cascaded distance relay tripping events following line contingencies [16] .
Contributions of the Work
This research leads to an innovative method to identify one of the basic patterns of cascaded events following a contingency, thereby reducing the possibility of large-scale blackouts. The proposed approach makes use of a fuzzy inference system to identify the generator tripping events due to over-excitation protection. The proposed system is expected to provide system operators with a vulnerability assessment report with warning signals on cascaded generator tripping events. This work is an extension of the on-line steady state security assessment framework that is the standard practice in industry.
Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 provides a review of past major blackouts in North America. It is shown that cascaded events such as transmission line and generator outages have contributed to catastrophic power failures. The chapter continues with a discussion of existing techniques for preventing wide area outages against cascaded events. Chapter 3 summarizes the basic patterns of cascaded events in blackouts and provides an explanation of the fuzzy inference system method. The chapter also gives an overview of the technical problem associated with cascaded events triggered by over-excitation protection. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the proposed FIS based methodology that can be used to obtain the post-contingency field current. Chapter 5 includes the simulation results obtained from steady state and dynamic simulations on a 200 bus test system. Chapter 6 gives the conclusion and future work.
CHAPTER 2. PREVETING BLACKOUTS AGAINST CASCADED EVENTS
Review of Major Blackouts in North America
There have been a number of major power system blackouts in North America. Electric service to more than 8 million people in the metropolitan area and to the commercial and industrial users of this area was interrupted for periods from 5 to 25 hours [3] . 
WECC, July 2, 1996
Characteristics of Cascaded Events in Major Blackouts
An analysis of the five major blackouts summarized above shows that all these major blackouts involve complex sequences of cascaded events. In general, these cascaded events were initiated by a single event or a combination of events, such as the misoperation of a backup zone-3 relay in the 1965 blackout, two lightening strokes in the 1977 blackout, the blackout. Following the initiating contingencies, the cascaded events occurred in a sequence.
The general sequence of the events in major blackouts is illustrated in Figure 1 . The causes of cascaded events in the past five major blackouts are summarized in Table 2 .
Figure 1. Sequence of Events Leading to Blackout
As it is shown in Table 2 , the causes of cascaded events leading to catastrophic outages are usually complex. They may involve faults, equipment failures, malfunctions, communication and information problems, misoperation of protection equipments, and human errors, etc. The external factors can also contribute to the events, e.g., tree contacts, lightening, and excessive line sagging in summer.
Table 2. Major Causes of Cascaded Events in Major Blackouts
It is also observed that four out of the five past blackouts occurred in summer when the power system was heavily stressed. The reason is that the higher load brings more pressure for the system to maintain the voltage profile. Thus, a single event is more likely to trigger other events that can cause a large blackout. If proper planning criteria are followed, most power systems are designated to be able to operate safely such that a single initial event will not cause further cascaded failures [14] . However, if the system is operating under the peak load condition, depending on the severity of the event, the system may enter an emergency state following the disturbance. If proper control actions or operator intervention are not taken in a timely manner, the system may be susceptible to further failures and subsequent cascading.
Undesirable Relay Tripping in Cascaded Events
As mentioned in Section 1.2, events that contribute to the cascaded sequences are probabilistic in nature. Therefore, it is not feasible to predict the cascaded events that will occur in the future. However, it is useful to determine the basic patterns of cascading, i.e., which event may trigger other event(s). 
Human errors √
The undesirable zone 3 relay operations and undesirable generator tripping by overexcitation protection are two of the basic patterns. As shown in Table 2, undesirable zone 3 relay and other generation and transmission backup relay operations have contributed to the 1965, 1996 and 2003 blackouts [11] . A study by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) indicates that protective relays are involved in about 75 percent of major disturbances [4] . Given the importance of undesirable relay operations, recognition of these two basic patterns becomes a critical step toward the understanding of cascaded events.
Undesirable Zone 3 Relay Operation
One of the basic patterns of cascaded events is the undesirable zone 3 relay operations that do not involve a fault. Undesirable zone 3 relay operations can lead to unnecessary loss of transmission lines [15] . These zone 3 relay operations can be caused by power flows 
Undesirable Generator Tripping by Over-Excitation Protection
Undesirable generator tripping by over-excitation is another basic pattern of cascaded events. Generator tripping by over-excitation protection can reduce the reactive power supply in the system, causing the system voltage profile to decline. One generator tripping may trigger another generator to trip, leading to cascaded events.
(a) (b) Figure 3 shows an example of cascaded generator tripping caused by over-excitation protection. In Figure 3 (a), due to a fault on line B3-B4, the bus voltage at B3 falls and the field current of G2 increases. If line B3-B4 is heavily loaded and MW output of G2 is also at a high level before the contingency, the line outage can cause a heavy loading condition of G2, and therefore the unit may be tripped by its over-excitation protection. Tripping of G2 can cause further reduction of the reactive power supply in the system. As shown in Figure 3 (b), generator G1 becomes overloaded after G2 is lost and G1 may also be tripped by its own over-excitation protection.
Figure 3. Example of Cascaded Generator Tripping
Undesirable tripping of generators initiated by over-excitation protection contributed to the 1996 and 2003 blackouts in the U.S. The first event in the Aug. 14, 2003, blackout is the Eastlake 5 generator tripping. It was an excitation system failure-as voltage fell at the generator bus, the generator tried to increase its voltage on the AC winding of the machine quickly. This caused excessive armature and field currents on the generators and finally led the generator's excitation protection scheme to trip the plant [5] . Furthermore, between 16:05 and 16:10 at that day, 29 generators tripped, which triggered the first major power swing.
These trips were caused by the generators' protective relays that are responding to overloaded transmission lines. Many of these trips were reported as under-voltage and overcurrent [5] .
In the Aug.10, 1996, blackout, over-voltage during the disturbance caused relay operations due to the manual excitation control. However, even if automatic excitation control is in service, it is possible that the post-contingency power system requires a significant amount of VARs. The consequence may be excessive armature and field currents on the generators that increase the risks of voltage instability.
State-of-the-Art on Prevention of Cascaded Events
Some studies concerning blackouts have centered on the goal of preventing cascaded events from starting, or at least, reducing their rate of occurrence. This section provides a survey of the state-of-the-art on the prevention of cascaded events.
The conceptual design of the Strategic Power Infrastructure Defense (SPID) system that is aimed at prevention of the wide area grid outages against cascaded events has been developed [7] . By incorporating multi-agent system technologies, the SPID system is intended to assess the power system vulnerability, monitor hidden failures of protective devices and provide adaptive control actions to prevent catastrophic failures and cascading sequences of events.
The Special Protection Scheme (SPS) is used as an event-based emergency control for mitigating conditions that can cause unusual stress on the power system [8] . SPS is based on direct detection of predefined outages, with high-speed binary signals to control centers for logic decisions, and then to power plants and substations for generator tripping and capacitor/reactor bank switching. Disadvantages of SPSs include their control capability only for predefined events, complexity, and high costs [8] .
A response-based Wide-Area stability and voltage Control System (WACS) has been developed [9] . WACS is a technology to use system-wide information together with distributed local intelligence and communication of selected information between separate locations to counteract propagation of major disturbances in the power system [10] . This technique is aimed at better management of the system condition during the disturbances and more reliable system performance under high power transfers.
A concept of Wide Area Monitoring and Control (WAMC) to mitigate cascaded events using a steady state approach is reported in [11] . WAMC could act in the early stage of the cascading failures and prevent it from spreading. A WAMC based approach is established to determine the boundary between the initiating event and its subsequent cascaded spreading. The WAMC long-term impact on the network is studied in [11] .
The hidden failures in protection systems have been identified as key contributors of the cascaded events. A technique to catalog and analyze the possible hidden failures in the protection systems is presented in [12] . The basic idea of this method is to identify the modes in which the protection systems may fail to operate correctly and the consequences of these failure modes.
A tripping of the generator by an armature over-current relay or the activation of an armature current limiter will severely cripple the power system which often causes the breakdown of the system voltages [17] . In [17] , a MW rescheduling strategy that alleviates the over-current condition on the armature is proposed. This method is to make small changes in the active power production of the generator, thereby fully utilizing the capability of the generator.
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
Problem Formulation
The purpose of this research is to estimate the post-contingency field currents in order to identify cascaded events triggered by over-excitation protection. To obtain accurate field currents, time-domain simulations are performed off line. Figure 4 shows a simplified overcurrent relay characteristic curve [17] . Once the post-contingency field current is obtained, which is illustrated by the red line in Figure 4 , the relay operating time can be estimated using the relay characteristic curve in Figure 4 . Note that there is a threshold pick-up value (indicated by vertical dotted line) for over-current relay to operate. As the dynamics of a power system become more significant, the discrepancy is also wider.
In this thesis work, a fuzzy rule based method is proposed to determine the postcontingency field current. The post-contingency field current obtained by steady state power flow calculation is corrected using fuzzy rules constructed from off-line time-domain simulation results.
Fuzzy Inference System Approach
What is fuzzy logic?
Fuzzy logic is used to handle the concept of partial truth instead of absolute truth. The concept of fuzzy logic was established by Dr. Lotfi Zadeh at UC-Berkeley in the 1960's [16] .
It was introduced as a method to handle the uncertainty of verbal terms. Basically, Fuzzy
Logic is a multivalued logic, which allows intermediate values to be defined between conventional evaluations like high/median/low.
In fuzzy logic, membership functions are used to define a degree of membership of a particular term. Several fuzzy sets are assigned to each variable to cover its domain and it is common for these sets to overlap so that the entire domain will be covered. In general, symmetric membership functions that peak at a value of one such as triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian, or bell-shaped are used. Intermediate membership functions may be added to the decision alternatives as well as the inputs to increase the accuracy of the network. These values can be reduced to more specific membership functions (e.g. very low, median high) if
necessary. An example membership plot for input variable voltage in per unit is given in Figure 5 . Table 3 . 
What is Fuzzy Inference System?
Fuzzy inference is the process of formulating the mapping from given inputs to an output using fuzzy logic. The mapping provides a basis from which decisions can be reached, or patterns discerned. The process of fuzzy inference involves all elements that are described in the previous sections: Membership Functions, Logical Operations, and If-Then Rules.
Once a fuzzy system has been specified, a defuzzification method must be selected.
In this research, a commonly used centroid defuzzification method is applied. The first step in this method is the aggregation of memberships of the fuzzy sets in the output variable given the firing level of each rule. The firing level is calculated by the total membership of each antecedent in the rule base using the appropriate operator method. Then, the rule firing level (product of degree of certainty) is applied to each consequent fuzzy set. The final crisp output value is the centroid of all fuzzy output sets.
Why Fuzzy Inference System is applied?
Fuzzy inference systems have been widely applied in control systems, data classification, decision analysis, expert systems, and other rule based systems. The main reasons why fuzzy inference systems are successfully used could be described as follows:
1. Fuzzy inference system is suitable for uncertain (include fuzziness, inaccurate, or incomplete data) or approximate reasoning (incomplete or inaccurate formulas or inference rules).
2. Fuzzy inference system is suitable for the system with a mathematical model that is difficult to derive.
3. Fuzzy inference system can make decision with estimated values under incomplete information.
Fuzzy inference system allows representation of descriptive or qualitative
expressions, which are more natural than mathematical.
5. In a fuzzy inference system, describing the rules is usually simpler and easier, and thus the systems can execute faster than conventional systems.
In this research, it is intended to determine the post-contingency field current. It is difficult to establish a precise mathematical model that describes the detailed and complex dynamic behaviors of the system. However, with fuzzy rules constructed from off-line timedomain simulation results, a fuzzy inference system can help to find the relationship between the time-domain simulation results and the steady state power flow results. The detailed methodology and procedure is introduced in the following sections.
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES
Calculation of Field Current Using Steady State Power Flow Solution
In the proposed approach, the post-contingency field current is calculated using As shown in Eq. (4-4) and Eq. (4-5), the terminal current I t and power angleϕ are calculated using active power P t , reactive power Q t , and terminal voltage E t .
As shown in Eq. (4-6), the internal angle δ is calculated using the terminal voltage E t , quadrature-axis synchronous reactance x q and Eq. (4-4) and Eq. (4-5).
As shown in Eq. (4-7), the internal voltage e q is calculated using terminal voltage E t and Eq. (4-6). 
Correction of Post-Contingency Field Current
As shown in Figure 7 , the proposed approach is to correct the post-contingency field current in two steps. 1) Developing a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) using off-line timedomain dynamic simulated data, 2) Obtaining a correction term to be added to the postcontingency field current calculated using the steady state power flow. As illustrated in 
Input and Output of FIS
The proposed FIS method is to correct the post-contingency field current based on the steady state power flow result. Hence, the output of FIS is the estimated value of the discrepancy between the post-contingency field currents obtained using time-domain simulation and steady state power flow, respectively.
The loss of heavily loaded transmission lines can cause voltage degradation at the load buses and increases the reactive power demand on the generators. A simple twomachine-one-load system shown in Figure 8 is used to illustrate the change in system conditions. Table 4 shows the pre-and post-contingency steady state power flow and the As shown in Table 4 , the post-contingency terminal voltage Et and active power Pt in the designated area are used as inputs for the FIS, i.e., input 1 and input 3 in Figure 9 .
The post-contingency field current can increase from the pre-contingency value.
When the increment between the pre-and post-contingency field currents obtained from power flow solutions is high, the difference of post-contingency field currents obtained from time-domain simulation and steady state power flow is also significant. Therefore, the increment of the post-contingency field current obtained by steady state power flow is used as an input, Input 2. All three inputs can be obtained from the results of on-line steady state contingency evaluation. 2) Generating fuzzy rules from the given data,
3) Assigning a degree to each of the generated rules, 4) Combining the generated rules with linguistic rules of human experts, and 5) Determining a mapping from input space to output space using a defuzzification procedure.
The above procedure only passes through the dataset one time. Hence, timeconsuming iterative training is avoided. Moreover, the membership functions are pre-defined in this algorithm. Therefore, it provides users with a higher level of flexibility.
An example of the FIS using Wang-Mendel's algorithm is given in Figure 10 . In the input-output dataset, input1 Q=0.65 has a degree of 0.75 on membership function M and a degree of 0.25 on H. The input2 V drop =15 has a degree of 1 on H. The output I=0.375 has a degree of 0.75 on H and a degree of 0.25 on L. As shown in Figure 10 , two  rules are generated from the input-output dataset. However, these two rules have the same IF part but a different Then part and therefore they are "in conflict." In this case, the rule that has a higher degree value is adopted. In this example, rule1 is adopted in the rule base because rule1 has a higher degree than rule2. By this conflict resolution procedure, the number of rules is reduced.
Figure 10. Example Procedure of Generating Fuzzy Rules
The centroid defuzzication method is applied to obtain the output of FIS. The output becomes a single number by calculating the center of gravity or center of area. Figure 11 shows an example of the centroid calculation procedure. In the upper right table in Figure 11 , it is assumed that input1 has a degree of 0.8 on membership function M and degree of 0.2 on H. Input2 has a degree of 0.7 on M and degree of 0.3 on H. Figure 11 shows four rules that are satisfied. The degree of output mo is derived using product operation for the degree of Figure 11 . Note that D in Figure 11 denotes the center value of the output region.
(The center of a fuzzy region is defined as the point that has the smallest absolute value among all the points at which the membership function for this region has membership value equal to one.) D of membership function L equals to 0.2, D of M equals to 0.3 and D of H equals to 0.4. Consequently, the output value is 0.27 which is derived from the equation in Figure 11 which determines the center of gravity of the fuzzy sets. 
CHAPTER 5. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to evaluate the performance of the developed FIS, a case study is performed using a 200-bus test system. This test system is a variation of the simplified model of the western inter-connection in the U.S. The demonstration in this section is based on PSS/E power flow solutions and PSS/E time-domain simulations. Four different load levels, shown in Table 5 , are created by changing generation and loads. FIS is developed for correction of its post-contingency field current and is applied to the generator G43 in Figure 12 . Figure 12 shows the simplified diagram of test system. Table 6 shows the specification of the system model. 
Description of Test System
Training Datasets
A total of 7 active power output levels of G43, ranging from 97.2 to 486 MW, are used to vary the field current. Note that the rated capacity of G43 is 540MVA and the rated MW output is 486MW. As shown in Table 6 , the total number of the training datasets is 147.
Although various MW output levels and line contingencies are used, the output values tend to be small. To enhance the performance of FIS by spreading the data points in a wider range, the logarithm function is applied to the output on the basis of Eq. (5-1). The number of membership functions of input1 is 3, the numbers of membership functions of input2, input3 and output are 7, respectively. A FIS rule base is shown in Table   7 . 
Validation of Proposed Fuzzy Inference System
In order to verify the developed FIS, 10 contingency scenarios that are not included in the training datasets are developed. From Figure 13 and Table 8 , it can be seen that the corrected post-contingency field currents by FIS are close to the post-contingency field currents obtained by time-domain simulation. The maximum mismatch between the two field currents is 4.73%. Without the FIS, G43 is tripped at 137 seconds because the field current IFD continuously exceeds the threshold (1.12 per unit) for 120 seconds, which results in an excessive reactive power output from G149 after 137 seconds. The maximum reactive power of G149 is 1 per unit. See the alternate long and short dash line in Figure 16 . If one considers the change of power system conditions such as load increases, it is highly possible that another generator (G149) would trip by the over-excitation protection.
With the FIS, the undesired G43 tripping can be prevented by reducing the terminal voltage from 1.05 per unit to 1.02 per unit. As shown in Figure 16 , the field current IFD is lower than the threshold after the contingency. The reactive power output of G149 is also within the allowable range. Thus, the proposed FIS can serve as the basis for determination of the remedial actions needed to prevent undesirable generator tripping.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, the FIS technique is proposed for the identification of cascaded generator tripping events caused by field over-current relays. The proposed method is developed in the framework of on-line steady state security assessment. For a given list of next contingencies, the proposed method is developed to identify the contingencies that will be followed by cascaded generator tripping events. The FIS is based on fuzzy rules constructed automatically using off line time-domain simulation results. The FIS categorizes the detailed simulation cases into rules and allow uncertainties through fuzzy logic. The proposed FIS performs well as the rules used for correction are derived from detailed timedomain simulations.
The proposed method is based on an on-line security assessment framework. The list of next contingencies is hypothetical, i.e., they have not occurred. As a result, if appropriate, system operators have the time needed to take remedial actions to reduce the field current.
Remedial actions may include generator re-dispatch or reduction of terminal voltages.
The developed FIS can easily be applied for another over-excitation protection such as armature over-current relay, because the relay characteristic of armature current is the same as the characteristics of field current relay.
Although significant progress has been made in this research, the following important issues remain to be addressed in the future work:
1. The field or armature current limiter should be examined.
2. Magnetic Saturation should be incorporated.
